Spain’s National Police has told the judge investigating July’s mass crossing into Ceuta that the social-media networks behind it maintained 97 telephone connections with numbers linked to Moroccan security and intelligence structures, according to a 77-page report filed with the court, a finding that contrasts with the intelligence service’s conclusion that no evidence ties the events to Rabat.
Executive summary
- In a supplementary report to National Court judge María Tardón, the National Police’s National Center for Immigration and Borders (CENIF) says the administrators and promoters of the WhatsApp and Facebook groups that drove the July 30-31 crossing held 97 connections with phone numbers associated with Moroccan police, gendarmerie and intelligence bodies, RTVE reported.
- Police base the link on two indications: the numbers were saved in third-party contact lists under explicit security-force titles, and they match identities in a leaked Moroccan police database attributed to the hacker group Jabaroot. The CENIF has asked the judge to request identifying data from Google and Meta.
- The flagged contacts span several Moroccan structures, from the national police (DGSN) and intelligence services to Royal Gendarmerie and traffic units, converging on district police stations in Casablanca and decision centers in Rabat, according to RTVE’s account of the filing.
- Judge Tardón has summoned Spain’s consul in Tetuan at the time of the crossing and the former chief of staff of the government delegation in Ceuta to testify on November 26, after a police witness described an urgent, unusual border crossing by the diplomat two days before the events.
- The police report describes a scheme of “diffuse authorship” and acknowledges its evidence does not conclusively establish who took part or to what degree; the CNI intelligence service reported separately that it found no evidence of Moroccan orchestration.
The 97 connections
The new report, submitted to Judge Tardón of the Audiencia Nacional, Spain’s National Court, extends a technical analysis the CENIF delivered in August. Investigators examined the contacts of 19 users catalogued as administrators and 32 as “dynamizers” of the messaging groups that promoted the crossing, drawn from 19 WhatsApp groups totaling 1,141 identified phone numbers, according to state broadcaster RTVE. El Faro de Ceuta, which said it reviewed the 77-page document, reported the same group counts.
Within those contact lists, police found 97 connections with numbers that could belong to members of Moroccan security forces and intelligence services. The link rests on two indications, RTVE reported: the numbers appear in third parties’ address books “under explicit denominations and titles” of security bodies, and they correlate with identities contained in a leak attributed to the hacker group Jabaroot. In one examined phone, investigators found about ten references such as “chief inspector” and “General Information police station,” IBTimes reported.
Police argue these contacts could have acted as liaisons or intermediaries, creating a communication channel with a higher degree of anonymity than the groups used to spread the call. The possible links “are not restricted to one specific police force or a single territorial level,” the report says, but span several Moroccan security and intelligence structures, including the DGSN national police, intelligence services, Royal Gendarmerie units, personnel assigned to royal palace security and traffic units, according to RTVE’s account. Many records converge on operational units and district police stations in Casablanca and extend to “nerve centers of decision in Rabat,” where Morocco’s police, domestic and foreign intelligence and northern auxiliary forces are headquartered.
Telemadrid reported that investigators have fully identified 49 of the 97 suspects by name, date of birth and badge number after cross-checking them against the leaked Moroccan police database, and that the CENIF has asked the judge to seek data from Google and WhatsApp owner Meta to identify the rest. RTVE confirmed the request for new diligence aimed at Google and Meta.
“Diffuse authorship”
The report is careful about its own limits. Police describe the crossing as following a scheme of “diffuse authorship” built on social media and “compartmented action,” factors that “enormously complicate identifying a causal nexus” between the phases and their authors, according to RTVE. The connections are recorded as relevant elements for the judicial investigation “without conclusively establishing the identity or degree of participation” of the people linked to those numbers, IBTimes noted. Investigators consider it unusual for ordinary users to keep such proximity to security structures, and raise several explanations, including that the liaison profiles formed part of those structures, worked for them or maintained direct contact with their members.
An earlier CENIF report, filed days before, identified 18 Moroccan security officials it said held a “supra-corporate” level of coordination during the crossing, after interviews with 81 of the migrants who entered Ceuta produced 13 formal statements, RTVE reported. That document described a “common behavior” on the ground, including inactivity, guidance and control by members of different security structures, that “points to a planned and organized action” expressed through “simple service instructions common to all the security structures present,” as Sada Journal reported on November 18.
A contested picture
The police findings sit alongside contrary assessments in the same case. The CNI, Spain’s intelligence service, told the court in a report dated November 11 that “no evidence has been obtained to date” that the crossing was “instigated, planned or coordinated by the Moroccan authorities,” attributing the surge to a viral social-media call with no identifiable single instigator, according to El País. Guardia Civil filings documented specific episodes on the ground but cautioned they did not establish a general order from Rabat, and its intelligence headquarters assessed that Morocco’s security forces “remained committed to migration control” in the hours before the crossing. El Faro de Ceuta noted the CENIF’s planning thesis “fits neither the CNI’s initial conclusions nor, even less, the Guardia Civil’s.”
Moroccan authorities have not publicly responded to the new report. Morocco’s Le360 news site dismissed the CENIF filing as an “obsession with accusing Morocco” substituting for proof. Rabat has previously rejected Spanish accusations over the crossing.
The judge calls new witnesses
Separately, Judge Tardón has summoned Spain’s consul in Tetuan at the time of the events and Gonzalo Sanz Ruiz, former chief of staff of the government delegate in Ceuta, to testify as witnesses on November 26, at the request of the National Court prosecutor’s office, according to a court order reviewed by RTVE.
The summons follows testimony from a National Police officer who said that on July 28 he received instructions to open a specific access lane to allow the urgent entry into Ceuta of the consul in Tetuan, a circumstance he described as absolutely unusual. The same witness said comments circulating among police officers held that the consul had come to warn Spanish authorities of a possible mass entry from Morocco, though he had no direct knowledge of that. The judge wrote that the relevance lies not in the rumors but in the “objective confirmation” of an urgent consular trip, exceptional border measures and its coincidence with a period of detected “extraordinary migratory pressure,” and called it “essential” to know whether the consul traveled on July 28-31, why, whom he met and what information he passed on.
Diplomatic sources cited by The Objective offered a more mundane account: the diplomat who crossed on July 28 was Fernando Villalonga, appointed to take up the Tetuan consulate on August 1, who arrived by ferry from Algeciras with his car, his dog and moving luggage, and for whom the consulate sent a vehicle and arranged a lane at the Tarajal crossing. Those sources said he held no meetings with Spanish or Moroccan authorities beyond customary introduction letters, called the episode “a confusion of people, days and posts” and said they expected “little judicial scope” from that line, Info en Claro reported. The judge’s first summons mistakenly named the consul in Tangier before being corrected within minutes, the same account said. El Español had earlier identified the traveler as outgoing consul Álvaro Castillo, whose last day in the post was July 31; Tardón’s request covers whoever held the post during the week of July 27 to August 2.
Tardón also postponed to December 1 the testimony of former government delegate Miguel Ángel Pérez Triano, who was charged last week, the first senior official under investigation in the case. And she gave the Ceuta Guardia Civil command three days to identify a police confidant named Ahmed, a resident of Benzú, who allegedly warned of unusual movements in Castillejos, the Moroccan town bordering Ceuta, in the days before the crossing.
What to watch
- Whether Judge Tardón orders the requested data requests to Google and Meta, and what those companies can provide.
- The November 26 testimony of the former consul in Tetuan and of Gonzalo Sanz Ruiz, and Pérez Triano’s appearance on December 1.
- Any response from the CNI or the prosecutor to the CENIF’s latest filing, and any official Moroccan comment.
- Further CENIF reports: El Faro de Ceuta says the documents reaching the judge are growing steadily broader.
Editorial method: This report is based on RTVE’s account of the CENIF filing and the court order it reviewed, El Faro de Ceuta’s review of the 77-page report, IBTimes, Telemadrid and The Objective’s diplomatic-sources account of the consul’s entry. The underlying police documents and court filings have not been independently reviewed by Sada Journal. All findings and quotations are attributed to the bodies or outlets reporting them. The CENIF’s indications are reported as police findings, not established facts; the CNI’s contrary conclusion and the Guardia Civil’s assessments are presented on the same standard. Quotations from Spanish-language reports are translated. Editorial responsibility remains with Sada Journal.

